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Abstract The literature can justify both increasing and decreasing marginal taxes
(IMT & DMT) on top incomes under different welfare objectives and income distribu-
tions. Even when DMT are theoretically optimal, they are often politically infeasible.
Then a flat tax seems to be a constrained optimal solution. We show however that,
given any flat tax we can increase the total utility of a poor majority by raising the top
income tax rate under a simple condition, which can be checked with empirical data.
We further generalize our main results allowing different welfare weights, declining
elasticity of labor supply and more tax bands.
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1 Introduction
Throughout most developed and developing economies, income distributions have
become increasingly skewed in recent decades (Stiglitz 2012; Piketty 2014). One
reason has been declining marginal tax rates for top incomes. Another is the effective
high marginal tax faced by low income earners due to withdrawal of benefits as earnings
rise, leading to the poverty trap. The existing tax structures in most developed countries
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are U-shaped, with increasing marginal tax (IMT) on high income earnings (but not
on capital gains). The justification of IMT on top incomes is to raise revenue from
those most able to pay, and provide a social safety net for the poor. This view is
theoretically justified by Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) based on their assumption
that top income follows Pareto distributions (see also Salanié 2003).
However, the shape of the optimal tax curve seems to be sensitive to income distri-
butions. With a bounded distribution, Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) find zero optimal
marginal tax rate for the top earners. In general optimal tax curves are often inversely
U-shaped or even declining (see Tuomala 1984; Kanbur and Tuomala 1994; Boadway
et al. 2000; Tarkiainen and Tuomala 2007; Hashimzade and Myles 2007; Boadway
and Jacquet 2008; Kaplow 2008), implying decreasing marginal taxes (DMT) on top
incomes. But as Warren Buffet famously complained, the lower effective average tax
rates paid by the rich, due to low capital gain taxes and various loopholes, are widely
perceived to be unfair. This political problem often imposes a binding constraint and
suggests a constrained optimal solution to be a flat tax, which by continuity should be
closer to the optimal DMT and dominate IMT. Moreover, a flat tax will reduce admin-
istrative costs and avoid incentive distortions (see Atkinson 1995 for a good overview).
Thus Mankiw et al. (2009) argue that “A flat tax, with a universal lump-sum transfer,
could be close to optimal”.
On the other hand, Diamond and Saez (2011), Piketty and Saez (2012, 2013)
(DSPS) argue that if policy makers ignore the welfare of the richest group (due to
their low marginal utility of income) and focus on the poor majority, the tax rate for
top income should be 70–80%, supposedly higher than the tax rate for lower incomes.
This policy has been successfully applied in the Scandinavian countries where high
top tax rates co-exist with high labour force participation and the highest level of life
satisfaction (Kleven 2014). The validity of different policy recommendations, IMT or
flat tax, seems crucially dependent on social objectives as well as income distribution.
This paper shows that even when DMT are optimal but not feasible, a flat tax may
not be the next best alternative. Given any flat tax, we can increase the total utility
of a poor majority by raising the tax rate on top earners under a simple condition,
which means the optimal tax on top earnings derived by Saez (2001) is higher than the
optimal flat tax. This condition generally holds when the poor majority is sufficiently
large.
Following DSPS (though they consider more general cases), we ignore the interests
of the rich group and focus on the poor. Later we allow different weights given to
different poor households, leading to a similar effect as decreasing marginal utility of
income assumed by DSPS. Surprisingly, when we put more weight on the very poor
households, a higher tax for top earners is less likely to benefit the poor.
We first assume a constant elasticity of labour supply for the whole population.
Later we assume more realistically declining elasticity with income and show that a
higher top tax is more likely to be justified. This is consistent with the optimal IMT
obtained by Aaberge and Colombino (2013) and Andrienko et al. (2014), using data
from Norway, US, UK and Australia, with declining elasticity of labour supply.
Continuous tax curves have been criticized as “too far removed from the tax–benefit
systems observed in practice to be a useful guide for policy” (Chone and Laroque
2005, p. 396). Apps et al. (2009) remark that “Given its significance in practice, the
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piecewise linear tax system seems to have received disproportionately little attention
in the literature on optimal income taxation.” Following Diamond and Saez (2011)
who argue for practical and useful research on tax policy, we first consider two-band
taxes. This system is the natural first step beyond a flat tax and can model IMT and
DMT as well as a flat tax. Furthermore the two-band tax literature finds DMT optimal.
Sheshinski (1989) first argued for increasing two-band taxes. However, Slemrod
et al. (1994) find errors in his proof and use numerical simulations to show that DMT
maximize maximin and utilitarian objectives. Similarly Salanié (2003), Hindricks and
Myles (2006) obtain optimal decreasing two-band taxes in a two-class economy. Hence
it is interesting to see if both decreasing and increasing two-band taxes dominate any
flat tax. We later allow more tax bands and generalize our result accordingly.
We introduce our two-band tax model in the next section. Section 3 shows that any
flat tax is Pareto dominated by some DMT. Section 4 gives a sufficient condition for
a higher top tax rate to benefit a poor majority and shows it is valid if the majority
is sufficiently large. Section 5 extends our model and generalizes the results allowing
different welfare weights for the poor, declining elasticity of labor supply and multiple-
tax bands. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Basic Model
We assume that a population, normalized to unity, consists of a continuum of house-
holds, whose wage is denoted by w, and is distributed on [a, b], where a > 0, b
is bounded, but can be very large and approximately treated as infinite. The density
and cumulative functions of w are denoted by f (w) and F(w). We define the poor
population as those with wages below a fixed level w¯, and denote those with higher
wages as the rich. The government’s objective is to maximize the total utility of the
poor. This is similar to Diamond and Saez (2011) who give virtually zero weight to
the rich in the social welfare function due to decreasing marginal utility of income.
Our objective can be justified by the political goal of income redistributions. We first
treat the poor equally but will give them different welfare weights in Sect. 5(i).
Every household has a quasi-linear utility, m − x1+1/ ε/(1 + 1/ε), where m is net
income, x is labour supply and ε is its elasticity. This simple utility function has been
widely used in the literature (e.g. Atkinson 1995). We first assume an identical ε for
the whole population and later allow declining elasticity in Sect. 5(ii).
Given wage w, a household’s pre-tax earnings y = wx. The government imposes
two tax rates, t1 and t2, for earnings below and above a threshold Y . The tax revenue,
after a fixed expenditure is paid, is distributed to all households equally as a basic
income, denoted by B. Given our unit population B is also equal to the total transfer
received by the whole population. The two-band taxes reduce to a flat tax when t1 = t2.
We will allow more tax bands in Sect. 5(iii).
Given t1, t2, Y and B, households’ utility functions can be written as:
u1 = wx(1 − t1) − x
1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε + B for wx ≤ Y (1)
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u2 = wx(1 − t2) + (t2 − t1)Y − x
1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε + B for wx > Y (2)
Every household chooses labour supply x to maximize utility. We first consider
IMT, i.e. t1 < t2 and assume Y ≥ w¯1+ε(1 − t1)ε. Thus every poor household faces
the lower rate t1, and chooses optimal labour supply x = wε(1 − t1)ε. This can be
justified by the political agenda to help the poor by charging them a low tax rate t1.
Substituting it into (1), we obtain the maximized utility wε+1(1− t1)ε+1/(1+ε)+ B.
Integrating it over [a, w¯], we get the total utility of the poor as our objective function:
W =
∫ w¯
a
(1 − t1)1+ε
1 + ε w
1+ε f (w)dw + B F(w¯) (3)
Given Y ≥ w¯1+ε(1 − t1)ε and t1 < t2, the population is divided into three groups.
All poor households and some rich ones with w < wˆ ≡ [Y/(1 − t1)ε]1/(1+ε) choose
labor supply x = wε(1−t1)ε and pay tax of t1(1−t1)εwε+1. Very rich households with
w > w1 ≡ [Y/(1− t2)ε]1/(1+ε) choose x = wε(1− t2)ε and pay tax t2(1− t2)εwε+1 +
(t1 − t2)Y . The remaining rich households with wˆ < w ≤ w1 choose x = Y/w,
earning Y , i.e. bunching, and pay t1Y . As t1[F(w1)− F(wˆ)]+ (t1 − t2)[1− F(w1)] =
t1[1 − F(wˆ)] − t2[1 − F(w1)], the total tax revenue from these three groups is:
R =
∫ wˆ
a
t1(1 − t1)εw1+ε f (w)dw +
∫ b
w1
t2(1 − t2)εw1+ε f (w)dw
+{t1[1 − F(wˆ)] − t2[1 − F(w1)]}Y (4)
We assume the fixed expenditure is less than R, so B is positive and maximized
whenever R is. So we can replace R by B. Under a flat tax, t1 = t2 = t , we have
wˆ = w1, and (4) reduces to
∫ b
a
t (1 − t)εw1+ε f (w)dw. Then our objective function
(3) reduces to:
W =
∫ w¯
a
[(1 − t)w]1+ε
1 + ε f (w)dw (3
′)
+ F(w¯)
∫ b
a
t (1 − t)εw1+ε f (w)dw
3 Flat Tax and DMT
The literature (e.g. Slemrod et al. 1994) has shown that DMT are generally optimal
for two-band taxes under maximin or utilitarian objectives. In this section we show
that a flat tax is always Pareto dominated by some DMT.
We first find the optimal flat tax which maximizes (3′). To simplify the notation we
denote the total earnings of the poor under zero tax by E1 ≡
∫ w¯
a w
1+ε f (w)dw and
denote the corresponding earnings of the rich by E2 ≡
∫ b
w¯
w1+ε f (w)dw. The total
zero-tax earnings of the whole population is E = E1 + E2. Since the population is
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normalized to 1, E is also the average zero-tax earnings of the whole population. Then
the average earnings of the poor and rich are e1 ≡ E1/F(w¯) and e2 ≡ E2/[1− F(w¯)]
respectively. By the definition we always have e1 ≤ E ≤ e2.
We differentiate (3′) and find dW/dt = [1−t (1+ε)](1−t)ε−1 F(w¯)E −E1(1−t)ε.
It is positive if and only if t < (1−e1/E)/(1+ε−e1/E]. Hence we get the following
result.
Proposition 1 The optimal flat tax to maximize (3′) is t∗ = 1−e1/E1+ε−e1/E .
This result is a special case of Piketty and Saez (2013), who derive an optimal linear
tax of (1 − g¯)/(1 + ε − g¯), where g¯ is the average social welfare weight weighted by
pre-tax incomes, which “is also the ratio of the average income weighted by individual
social welfare weights gi to the actual average income” (p. 21). Given our welfare
function, which only values the utility of the poor, g¯ = e1/E and their formula
reduces to our t∗. Piketty and Saez (2013) further discuss the median voter tax rate,
which maximizes the utility of the median earner, and point out “a tight connection
between optimal tax theory and political economy”. If e1 equals the median no-tax
earnings, t∗ is the median voter tax. Interestingly, the median income in the U.S. was
roughly $26,000, when the average top 1% income was estimated by Piketty and Saez
as $1.2 million. Given the average earnings of $38,000, the average of the bottom
99%, e1 was also about $26,000. Thus our flat tax for the 99% majority is also the
median voter tax.
Next we show that any flat tax t (0 < t < 1/(1 + ε)), including t∗, is Pareto
dominated by some DMT. 1/(1 + ε) is the revenue maximizing flat tax. We exclude
the case of t ≥ 1/(1 + ε), which lies in the inefficient part of the Laffer curve. Now
we lower tax rate t2 for earnings beyond Y = (1 − t)ε[1 − εt/(1 − t)]b1+ε, which
is positive given t < 1/(1 + ε). As b1+ε is the highest no-tax earnings, there is a
positive mass earning more than Y , and we can show that each of them will pay more
tax with a lower tax rate t2. The tax payment from a household within this group is
t2(1− t2)εwε+1 +(t − t2)Y . According to Saez (2001) the impact of tax change can be
decomposed into two effects, mechanical and behavioral1. The former can be obtained
under a constant labor supply and expressed as [(1 − t2)εwε+1 − Y ]t2. The latter
is due to the response of labor supply and indicated by −εt2(1 − t2)ε−1wε+1t2.
Adding them together the derivative of the tax payment respect to t2 is negative at
t2 = t if (1 − t)ε[1 − εt/(1 − t)]wε+1 < Y , which is guaranteed for any w < b given
our definition of Y . Thus each household earning more than Y pays more tax when t2
falls. These households must be better off due to a lower marginal tax rate and higher
basic income B. Moreover the poorer households are better off too due to higher B.
Therefore a lower t2 benefits everyone.
Proposition 2 Every flat tax is Pareto dominated by some DMT.
The intuition follows from Saez’ (2001) concept of behavioural and mechanical
responses. A lower t2 will motivate rich households to increase their labor supply. If
the tax threshold Y is set sufficiently high, the tax revenue loss will be limited, and the
1 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this decomposition.
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extra labor supply from each household can generate significant tax revenue due to its
high productivity. So the behavioural effect dominates the mechanical effect, leading
to a higher revenue. This lower tax applies to a positive mass, not just the highest
earner, different from the zero top marginal tax obtained by Sadka (1976) and Seade
(1977).
When DMT are optimal but politically infeasible, a flat tax seems to be better
than IMT since it should be closer to the true optimum DMT by continuity, and thus
dominates IMT. However, this monotonicity of tax policy may not be valid. Assuming
the government is politically constrained to implement two-band IMT, we will show
that the optimal flat tax is dominated by some IMT under a simple condition.
4 IMT Versus Flat Tax
Given the optimal flat tax t∗, the question now is whether some IMT (t1 < t2) can
generate a higher value of (3) than t∗ does. This must be true if we find ∂W/∂t1 < 0
and ∂W/∂t2 > 0 when t1 = t2 = t∗. In fact these two conditions are identical and we
can focus on ∂W/∂t2 > 0. Notice that the first term in (3) does not depend on t2. If
t2 maximizes (3), it must maximize B (i.e. R). This is essentially the approach taken
by Saez (2001). To prove that IMT can dominate the optimal flat tax, we just need to
show ∂ B/∂t2 > 0 when t1 = t2 = t∗, instead of finding the optimal t2.
For simple presentation we let Y = w¯1+ε(1 − t1)ε. This is not the only choice
to obtain our results. For example, if we let Y = w¯1+ε(1 − t∗)ε, the marginal poor
(w = w¯) will bunch when we lower t1 and raise t2, but this does not change the
condition for ∂W/∂t1 > 0 and ∂W/∂t2 < 0 at t1 = t2 = t∗, and has no effect on
our result. Since our goal is to show IMT can dominate t∗, this particular Y serves
our purpose. Y = w¯1+ε(1 − t1)ε implies wˆ = w¯ and the tax revenue (4) (hence B)
simplifies to:
B =
∫ w¯
a
t1(1 − t1)εw1+ε f (w)dw (4′)
+
∫ b
w1
t2(1 − t2)εw1+ε f (w)dw
+ {t1[1 − F(w¯)] − t2[1 − F(w1)]}Y
Then we investigate whether two-band taxes with t1 < t2 can lead to a higher value
of (3) than the optimal flat tax t∗, with B in (3) replaced by (4′). For simple expression
we denote the marginal household’s zero-tax earnings, w¯1+ε by y¯.
Proposition 3 There exists a two-bracket tax schedule with t1 < t∗ < t2 that domi-
nates the optimal linear tax rate t∗, if at t1 = t2 = t∗, we have
e1
E
>
y¯
e2
(5)
Proof see “Appendix A”. unionsq
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As we mentioned earlier, ∂W/∂t1 < 0 and ∂W/∂t2 > 0 depend on the same
condition. This is not coincidental. If both ∂W/∂t1 > 0 and ∂W/∂t2 > 0 at t1 =
t2 = t∗, it would be possible to increase (3) by raising t1 and t2 together. But this is
impossible since t∗ is the optimal flat tax to maximize (3′).
When (5) holds, any flat tax is dominated by both IMT and DMT. There is no
monotonicity in the optimal taxes. However, the superior IMT and DMT require
different thresholds for top tax rates. In proving the Pareto superiority of DMT,
we assumed Y = (1 − t)ε[1 − εt1−t ]b1+ε. For (5) to hold, i.e. ∂W∂t2 > 0, we need
(1− εt1−t )E2 > [1−F(w¯)]y¯ (see “Appendix A”). Since E2/[1−F(w¯)] = e2 < b1+ε, Y
associated with DMT must be higher than (1 − t)ε y¯ in the IMT case. Hence both a
higher and a lower top tax rate would be desirable if implemented at different income
thresholds.
Intuitively (5) can again be explained by Saez’ (2001) concept of behavioural and
mechanical responses as in Proposition 1. The difference is that here a higher t2
may raise some households’ tax payment and reduce others’. Given Δt2 > 0, the
mechanical effect on (4′) is equal to {∫ b
w¯
(1 − t∗)εw1+ε f (w)dw −[1 − F(w¯)]Y }Δt2,
and the behavioral effect is −[ε ∫ b
w¯
t∗(1 − t∗)ε−1w1+ε f (w)dw]Δt2. If their net effect
is positive, [1 − εt∗/(1 − t∗)]e2 > y¯, as shown by (A2) in “Appendix A”, the total tax
payment rises with t2, i.e., ∂ B/∂t2 > 0. Since 1 − εt∗/(1 − t∗) is equal to e1/E , the
condition reduces to (5)2.
Moreover, our result can be obtained by directly comparing the optimal flat tax
t∗ with the optimal top income tax rate obtained in Saez (2001). Without an income
effect as assumed here, his tax rate becomes (1 − g)/[1 − g + εe2/(e2 − y¯)], where g
is the social welfare weight given to the rich (also see Piketty and Saez 2013). In our
model g = 0 given zero welfare weight for the rich. Thus Saez’ optimal top income
tax rate becomes (e2− y¯)/[(1+ε)e2 − y¯]. If it is higher than t∗, IMT must dominate t∗.
However no one has explicitly compared these two tax rates. In fact Saez’ asymptotic
marginal tax rate ta can be obtained from [1 − εta/(1 − ta)]e2 = y¯. So ta > t∗ if and
only if (5) holds3. Otherwise Saez’ marginal tax for top income is inconsistent with
IMT.
To evaluate (5), it is often convenient to consider the income distribution function
G(y), with y = w1+ε, instead of the wage distribution F(w). The validity of (5) may
not depend on y¯. For instance, when the income distribution is nearly unbounded, we
may approximate it by a Pareto distribution, G(y) = 1 − y− α for y ≥ 1, α > 1. Then
condition (5) holds for any y¯4. This result is consistent with Diamond (1998). One
may attribute this result to the thick-tail of a Pareto distribution. However, if α is large,
the tail becomes very thin while (5) still holds. To see this point further, we consider
a thick-tailed distribution G(y) = (y/h)β, with 0 ≤ y ≤ h and β > 0. The number
2 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for his suggestion on this interpretation.
3 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing to this connection and implication.
4 As E2 = α y¯1−α/(α−1), 1 − G(y¯) = y¯− α, E = α /(α−1), e2 = y¯E , so (5) becomes e1 > 1.
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of rich households may even rise with income (if β > 1). But (5) never holds5. The
validity of (5) does not require an unbounded income either. For instance, consider
a bounded Pareto distribution with G(y) = (1 − y− α)/(1 − h− α), with 1 ≤ y ≤ h
and α > 1. It can be shown that (5) holds for any h and y¯, even when the maximum
income h is very low and close to 1. These examples demonstrate the sensitivity of
(5) to income distributions.
In spite of such complexity, the validity of (5) may be determined by simple data
without knowing income distributions precisely. For instance, Diamond and Saez
(2011) estimate the U.S. threshold of the top 1% as $0.4 million and their aver-
age earnings as $1.2 million. This implies y¯/e2 = 1/3, which is lower than e1/E ,
given e1 = $26,000 and E = $38, 000 as we mentioned earlier. So condition (5)
holds.
Moreover, if we know the income distribution above the threshold y¯, (5) can be
simplified. According to extreme value theory (Gnedenko 1943), for a wide range of
random variables, the conditional probability approximately follows a Pareto distri-
bution when they are sufficiently large. This theory and empirical evidence suggest a
Pareto distribution as a good approximation for top earners. Let G(y) = 1 − Ky− α
for y ≥ y¯, α > 1, we obtain e2/y¯ = α/(α − 1) and can simplify (5) to:
1 − e1
E
<
1
α
(6)
In this case a thick tail does have a crucial impact. Given e1/E , a very thick tail (α
close to 1) guarantees (6); while a thin tail (a large α) ensures its violation. For the top
U.S. 1% earners Diamond and Saez (2011) estimate α = 1.5, so (6) becomes e1/E >
1/3. It holds as e1/E = 26/38. For U.S. 1992 earnings above $150,000, Saez (2001)
shows α = 2 (i.e. y¯/e2 = 0.5). Similarly Bach et al. (2012) find α = 2 for German
top earnings. Then (6) becomes e1 > 0.5E . For any Pareto distribution with a finite
α, when w¯1+ε is sufficiently large, e1 must be close to E and (6) will certainly hold.
Corollary If high earnings follow a Pareto distribution, a higher tax on a small group
of top earners always benefits the remaining population.
This result supports DSPS’s view about a higher tax on top earners. But this may
only apply to a small rich group, e.g. 1%. The current top tax rate, however, usually
applies to a much larger group. Bach et al. (2012) argue that their top tax rate of
2/3 in Germany should only apply to an income level much higher than the current
threshold. Indeed when we consider a higher tax on a large group, (5) may not hold.
For instance, if we consider a higher tax on the top 50%, i.e. y¯ = the median earn-
ings, (5) does not hold for any lognormal distribution. Therefore, starting from the
optimal flat tax, raising the tax rate beyond the median earnings will not benefit the
poor 50%.
The question is how large the rich group should face a higher tax. It is difficult to
answer this question by (5) directly since it is very sensitive to income distributions
which can hardly be identified precisely. It would be desirable to check its validity
5 As E1 = β y¯1+β/hβ(β + 1), E = βh/(β + 1), and e1 = β y¯/(β + 1), (5) requires e2 > h.
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without assuming specific distributions. This is easier to do using another condition
equivalent to (5). It depends on whether we have a decreasing e1/e2, the ratio of the
average earnings of the poor and the rich (Proof: see “Appendix B”).
Proposition 4 (5) holds if and only if e1/e2 falls around y¯.
If e1/e2 is single peaked, it will fall after its maximum. If earnings are unbounded
and y¯ is sufficiently large, e1 approaches to E but e2 to infinity. So e1/e2 must fall
and IMT must dominate any flat tax. The question is: how large y¯ is “sufficient”. The
answer may not be obtained from the theory alone, but from empirical data.
Our data are obtained from the United Nation’s “World Income Inequality
Database” (May (2008)), and provide each decile’s earnings as percentages of aggre-
gate earnings. The data set does not contain the relevant information for all years.
To avoid subjective bias we use the most recent data for each country. Unfortunately,
our ratio of e1/e2 does not take into account complex tax systems which generate
real data. So we use the actual earnings ratios as approximation for zero-tax earn-
ings ratios. On the other hand, despite complex tax systems in G8 countries, we find
their e1/e2 curves are all single peaked and fall from similar thresholds of income
deciles.
We use a decile’s earnings as a percentage of the aggregate earnings to calculate
e1/e2. The ratio of this group’s earnings to that of the whole population is given
as r ≡ E1/E . So e1 = E1/G(y) = rE/G(y). e2 = (E − E1)/[1 − G(y)], i.e.
(1 − r)E/[1 − G(y)]. Hence e1/e2 = r [1 − G(y)]/(1 − r)G(y). The data provide us
the values of r for G(y) = 10–90%, giving us 9 values of e1/e2. The results for G8
countries are given in Table 1.
Apparently, the e1/e2 ratios differ significantly between eight countries. As we
mentioned earlier, these values are only approximations since we do not take into
account complex non-linear tax systems different from flat tax assumed here. Nonethe-
less these e1/e2 ratios all exhibit a single peak in G8 countries and surprisingly, they
start to decline around 80% of income levels. Hence a higher tax can be justified when
it is imposed on less than 20% of top earners on the behalf of more than 80% poor
majority.
Table 1 Ratio of e1/e2 for G8 countries
Country Year 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Canada 2000 0.25 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.34
France 2000 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.42
Germany 2000 0.31 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.38
Italy 2002 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.31
Russia 2000 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.23
UK 1999 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.28
USA 2000 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.27
Japan 1971 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.25
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5 Extensions
(i) Welfare weight So far we have treated all the poor equally. Ideally we may give them
different welfare weights, and allow a continuous treatment across the rich and the poor.
This is similar to the approach taken by DSPS based on decreasing marginal utility
of income. Decreasing welfare weights have a similar effect as assuming decreasing
marginal utility of income. Intuitively, one may expect that this should increase the
chance of justifying a higher top tax rate. However, like the conventional belief that
the maximin is most likely to justify IMT, this conjecture is not correct.
Given w¯ we assign welfare weight s(w) to every poor household w (≤ w¯) such
that
∫ w¯
a
s(w) f (w)dw = F(w¯). We then multiply s(w) with each poor household’s
net utility [(1 − t1)w]1+ε/(1 + ε) + B, and integrate the product over [a, w¯], to get a
weighted total utility of the poor as our new objective function:
W = (1 − t1)
1+ε
1 + ε
∫ w¯
a
s(w)w1+ε f (w)dw + B F(w¯) (7)
Objective (7) reduces to (3) when s(w) = 1 for any w ≤ w¯. Since s(w) falls with
w,
∫ w¯
a
s(w)w1+ε f (w)dw < ∫ w¯
a
w1+ε f (w)dw. We use e˜1 to denote the weighted
average no-tax earnings of the poor,
∫ w¯
a s(w)w
1+ε f (w)dw/F(w¯). The more weight
is given to the poorer households the lower e˜1 is. As in the previous case, we first
obtain the optimal flat tax t˜∗ which maximizes (7). It is similar to t∗, except for e1
being replaced by e˜1, i.e. t˜∗ = (1 − e˜1/E)/(1 + ε − e˜1/E]. Then a higher top tax rate
raises (7) if ∂W/∂t1 < 0 and ∂W/∂t2 > 0 when t1 = t2 = t˜∗, which holds under a
new condition (see “Appendix C”).
Proposition 5 IMT give a higher value of (7) than any flat tax if at t1 = t2 = t˜∗
e˜1
E
>
y¯
e2
(8)
When s(w) = 1, e˜1 = e1 and (8) reduces to (5). Condition (8) can also be linked
to Saez’ asymptotic marginal tax rate. Given any e˜1 < e1, the optimal tax rate for
top income remains the same as before, but the optimal flat tax t˜∗ is higher given
higher welfare weights on the very poor. So the former is less likely to be higher than
the latter, and (8) is less likely to hold than (5) is, and a higher top tax is less likely
to be justifiable, unexpectedly. The intuition is that the poorer households are less
productive, and rely more on income transfer. A higher tax on low earnings is less
damaging to them and more beneficial due to more money transfer from the rich. So
a flat tax is less likely to be dominated if we give most weight to the poorest.
The validity of (5) only implies a higher top tax rate can benefit the poor as a whole,
not necessarily each of them. (8) can tell us if it benefits a particular household. Our
objective (7) is identical to maximizing the utility of a household with earnings of e˜1,
as a representative family. When (8) holds, a higher top tax rate benefit those with
earnings equal or higher than e˜1. If e˜1 is the lowest earnings, all poor will be better
off. For instance, given a Pareto distribution with α = 1.5 for the top 1% earners,
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y¯/e2 = 1/3, and (8) becomes e˜1/E > 1/3. In most OECD countries (except for US),
the ratio of the minimum wage to average wage is more than 1/36. So a higher tax on
top 1% can benefit all 99%. Similarly, with α = 2 for the top German earnings, (8)
becomes e˜1/E > 0.5. The lowest and average monthly German salaries are e1,832
and e34497. Thus virtually all poor can benefit from a higher top tax.
(ii) Declining elasticity Empirical data show that full-time and high income earners
are less responsive to tax changes than part-time and low income earners (see Aaberge
and Colombino 2013 and Andrienko et al. 2014). So our assumption of constant
elasticity of labor supply is unrealistic. In fact this assumption is unfavorable for IMT.
Now we allow the elasticity to be declining with income. Our objectives (3) and (3′),
and the tax revenue (4′) remain valid, except that ε cannot be taken out of the integrals.
We follow the same approach as before, i.e. first obtain the optimal flat tax tˆ∗, which
maximizes (3′), then evaluate ∂W/∂t1 and ∂W/∂t2 when t1 = t2 = tˆ∗.
Following DSPS we define the average elasticity of labor supply, weighted by
earnings, as εˆ ≡ ∫ b
a
εw1+ε f (w)dw/ ∫ b
a
w1+ε f (w)dw, and define the average
elasticity of the rich as εˆ2 ≡
∫ b
w¯
εw1+ε f (w)dw/ ∫ b
w¯
w1+ε f (w)dw. Declining
elasticity implies εˆ2 < εˆ. Then we differentiate (3′) to get the optimal flat tax
tˆ∗ = (1−e1/E)/(1+ εˆ−e1/E). If ∂W/∂t1 < 0 and ∂W/∂t2 > 0 when t1 = t2 = tˆ∗,
some IMT dominate any flat tax.
Proposition 6 With declining elasticity of labor supply, some IMT dominate any flat
tax if at t1 = t2 = tˆ∗, we have
1 − e1
E
<
(
1 − y¯
e2
)
εˆ
εˆ2
(9)
Proof see “Appendix D”. unionsq
Inequality (9) reduces to (5) if εˆ2 = εˆ. Given εˆ2 < εˆ, (9) is more likely to hold than
(5) is, and a higher top tax rate is more likely to benefit the poor, as expected. Given a
Pareto distribution with α = 2 for top incomes, we have y¯/e2 = 0.5, and (9) becomes
1 − e1/E < 0.5εˆ/εˆ2. If εˆ/εˆ2 = 2 (e.g. εˆ = 0.4, εˆ2 = 0.2), (9) is guaranteed. Once
again an intuitive explanation emerges from the comparison of the optimal flat tax
and Saez’ asymptotic marginal tax rate. We know tˆ∗ depends on εˆ. But Saez’ revenue
maximizing top tax rate will be higher given a lower εˆ2. Hence (9) is more likely to
hold than (5) due to declining elasticity of labor supply.
(iii) More tax bands Finally, we consider the case of more than two tax bands. We
assume t1 only applies to incomes between Y and another lower threshold Y0, below
which different tax rates may apply. So t1 is imposed on households with w ≥ w0
where w1+ε0 (1 − t1)ε = Y0(w0 < w¯ as Y0 < Y ). Let u(w) be the utility of households
with w ≤ w0, not subject to either t1 or t2. Then the utility of the poor, (3) can be
6 See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIN2AVE.
7 See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/germany/wage.
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rewritten as:
W =
∫ w0
a
u(w) f (w)dw +
∫ w¯
w0
(1 − t1)1+ε
1 + ε w
1+ε f (w)dw + BF(w¯) (10)
Let F(w0) be the proportion of the households with w ≤ w0. Note that the tax
revenue from earnings below Y0 is independent of t1 and t2. When t1 = t2 = t , with
B0 representing the part independent of t , we can write the basic income as:
B = B0 + t (1 − t)ε
∫ b
w0
w1+ε f (w)dw − tY0[1 − F(w0)] (11)
The question is: whether a higher tax on income above Y (t2 > t) can lead to a
higher value of (10) than any partial flat tax t on incomes above Y0, given other tax
rates below Y0 fixed. To answer this question, we follow the same approach again as
before. We first obtain the optimal partial flat tax t
∗
on incomes above Y0. Then we
find the condition for ∂W/∂t1 < 0 and ∂W/∂t2 > 0 when t1 = t2 = t
∗
.
We let y0 ≡ w1+ε0 , and E0 be the zero-tax earnings of households with w ≥ w0,
i.e. E0 =
∫ b
w0
w1+ε f (w)dw. Their average earnings e0 = E0/[1 − F(w0)]. The flat
tax

t
∗
can be written as (1−d)/(1+ ε −d), where d = y0/e0 + (E0 − E2)/F(w¯)E0.
Thus we can generalize (5) to the case with more than two tax bands (see “Appendix
E”).
Proposition 7 IMT can do better than any partial flat tax if at t1 = t2 = t
∗
,
y0
e0
+ E0 − E2
F(w¯)E0
>
y¯
e2
(12)
In our previous two-band tax case, y0 = 0, w0 = a, E0 = E , (12) reduces to (5).
Although (12) is more complex than (5), its validity may be determined with simple
data. In particular (12) must hold when y0/e0 ≥ y¯/e2. For instance, if earnings above
y0 follow a Pareto distribution with y0/e0 = y¯/e2, (12) must hold and a higher tax rate
above y¯ is desirable. Moreover, let Y0 = $0.15 million and Y = $0.4 million, we have
y0/e0 = 0.5 according to Saez (2001), and y¯/e2 = 1/3 according to Diamond and
Saez (2011). Again (12) holds and the tax rate above $0.4 million should be higher.
These results again support DSPS’ higher taxes for top earners.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we argue that a large poor majority are often better off under IMT than any
flat tax. We obtain a sufficient condition, which only depends on aggregate features of
the income distribution and the tax threshold. Using empirical data from G8 countries
we find supporting evidence that a higher tax rate is justifiable when it is imposed
on a small group (less than 20%). However, IMT become less likely to dominate any
flat tax if we give more welfare weights to the very poor households. Similar to our
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original condition (5), more general results are obtained with declining elasticity of
labor supply and multiple tax bands. These findings support the argument of DSPS for
higher taxes on top earners. It also has interesting political economy implications, and
might perhaps be interpreted as an explanation for—or at least consistent with—IMT
on high income earners in most democracies, in contrast to much optimal tax theory.
In this paper we do not consider categorical benefits associated with unemployment
or low income. Those benefits create high marginal tax rates for participation in the
labour market—the ‘poverty trap’. This phenomenon, however, does not affect the
larger part of the working population. We focus on the tax rates relevant to the working
population and do not consider more complex structures. We do not focus on the
optimal difference in tax rates and the magnitude of social gains. Both tend to be small
in our model, but would be more significant given low marginal utility of income and
low elasticity of labour supply for the rich. Though highly stylized, we hope that this
paper contributes to the debate on tax policies.
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tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3
We show that ∂W/∂t1 < 0 and ∂W/∂t2 > 0 when t1 = t2 = t∗ if and only if
(5) holds. From (4′) we see ∂ B/∂w1 = t2 f (w1)Y − t2(1 − t2)ε f (w1)wε+11 = 0 as
(1 − t2)εw1+ε1 ≡ Y . So we can differentiate B given w1 fixed. As t1 = t2, w1 =
w¯, t1[1 − F(w¯)] − t2[1 − F(w1)] = 0, so we can ignore the change of Y when we
differentiate (4′) with respect to t1 and t2.
∂ B
∂t1
= (1 − t1)ε−1[1 − (1 + ε)t1]
∫ w¯
a
w1+ε f (w)dw + [1 − F(w¯)]Y
∂ B
∂t2
= (1 − t2)ε−1[1 − (1 + ε)t2]
∫ b
w1
w1+ε f (w)dw − [1 − F(w1)]Y
Using our notations of E1, E2 and y¯, they reduce to [1−εt/(1− t)]E1 +[1− F(w¯)]y¯
and [1 − εt/(1 − t)]E2 − [1 − F(w¯)]y¯. Substituting them and t1 = t2, we find
∂W
∂t1
= (1 − t)ε{F(w¯)
[(
1 − εt
1 − t
)
E1 + (1 − F(w¯))y¯
]
− E1} (A1)
∂W
∂t2
= (1 − t)εF(w¯)
{(
1 − εt
1 − t
)
E2 − [1 − F(w¯)]y¯
}
(A2)
As t∗ = (1 − e1/E)/(1 + ε − e1/E) and E1/F(w¯) = e1, (A1) < 0 and (A2) > 0
if and only if e1 E1/E + [1 − F(w¯)]y¯ − e1 < 0, and e1 E2/E − [1 − F(w¯)]y¯ > 0
respectively. Moreover as e1 E1/E − e1 = −e1 E2/E , and E2/[1 − F(w¯)] = e2, both
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inequalities hold if and only if e1e2 > E y¯, i.e. (5). If this holds, a two-bracket tax
schedule with t1 < t∗ < t2 dominates t∗. Since t∗ is the optimal flat tax, this schedule
must dominate any flat tax.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
The derivative of e1/e2 with respect to w¯ is negative if e2 ∂e1∂w¯ < e1
∂e2
∂w¯
.
Note e1 = E1F(w¯) , e2 = E21−F(w¯) , ∂E1∂w¯ = y¯ f (w¯) = − ∂E2∂w¯ . So we obtain
∂e1
∂w¯
= f (w¯)
F(w¯)2
[y¯F(w¯) − E1]
= f (w¯)
F(w¯)
(y¯ − e1). (B1)
∂e2
∂w¯
= f (w¯)[1 − F(w¯)]2 {E2 − y¯[1 − F(w¯)]}
= f (w¯)
1 − F(w¯) (e2 − y¯) (B2)
So e1/e2 falls with w¯ (or y¯) if and only if e2(y¯ − e1)/F(w¯) < e1(e2 − y¯)/[1− F(w¯)],
i.e. E2(y¯ − e1) < E1(e2 − y¯), or E y¯ < E1e2 + e1 = e1e2, which is (5).
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5
Since (7) is similar to (3), ∂W/∂t1 is similar to (A1) and < 0 if and only if
[(
1 − εt
1 − t
)
E1 + [1 − F(w¯)
]
y¯ − e˜1 < 0 (C)
Substituting t˜∗ = (1−e˜1/E)/(1+ε−e˜1/E) into (C), we get e˜1 E1/E+[1−F(w¯)]y¯ <
e˜1, or [1 − F(w¯)]y¯ < e˜1 E2/E , i.e. E y¯ < e˜1e2. This also applies to ∂W/∂t2 > 0.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 6
Similar to Appendix A, except for varying ε, we find when t1 = t2,
∂ B
∂t2
=
(
1 − εˆ2t
1 − t
)
(1 − t)εE2 − [1 − F(w¯)]Y (D1)
When t1 = t2 = tˆ∗, (D1) is positive if and only if
[
1 − εˆ2
εˆ
(
1 − e1
E
)]
E2 > [1 − F(w¯)]y¯ (D2)
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Dividing (D2) by E2, we get 1 − (1 − e1/E)εˆ2/εˆ > y¯/e2. One can check that the
same condition holds for ∂W/∂t1 < 0.
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 7
Given (11) and t1 = t2 = t , we have ∂ B/∂w0 = 0 as w1+ε0 (1 − t)ε = Y0. So we
differentiate (11) given w0 fixed, and find ∂ B/∂t = [1 − εt/(1 − t)](1 − t)εE0 −
Y0[1−F(w0)]. From (10) we see ∂W/∂w0 = 0 since u(w0) must be equal to w1+ε0 (1−
t)ε+1/(1 + ε). So we differentiate (10) given t1 = t2 and w0 fixed. Substitute ∂ B/∂t
into ∂W/∂t , we get
∂W
∂t
= F(w¯)
{(
1 − εt
1 − t
)
(1 − t)εE0 − Y0[1 − F(w0)]
}
(E)
− (E0 − E2)(1 − t)ε
The optimal partial flat tax can be solved from (E) = 0, as t ∗ = (1−d)/(1+ε−d),
where d = {y0[1 − F(w0)]+ (E0 − E2)/F(w¯)}/E0 = y0/e0 + (E0 − E2)/F(w¯)E0.
Then we check if ∂W/∂t2 > 0 by substituting

t
∗
into (A2). This is equivalent to
check if t
∗
< (1 − y¯/e2)/(1 + ε − y¯/e2), i.e., d > y¯/e2, which holds if and only if
y0
e0
+ E0 − E2
F(w¯)E0
>
y¯
e2
One can check that the same condition holds for ∂W/∂t1 < 0.
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